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Recognizing Multijurisdiction Class Action Judgments within Canada:
Key Questions—Suggested Answers
Janet Walker*
The law of res judicata may have to adapt itself to the class proceeding concept.1
I—
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II—

WHAT did Morguard really say about recognizing class action judgments?................... 3

III—

WHEN have courts recognized class action judgments (and when have they refused)? . 6

IV—

WHERE should multijurisdiction class actions be decided in Canada? ........................... 7

V—

WHY should Canadian courts recognize class action judgments? .................................... 9

VI—
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With the advent of parallel multijurisdiction class actions in Canada we need to
develop a workable means of coordinating them. To do so we must establish standards both
for granting or denying preclusive effect to class action judgments and for exercising
jurisdiction and we must find ways to assess when parallel actions should be consolidated
and which courts should decide them.
In this paper I offer some suggestions on how we might approach these questions.
First, we should focus not only on the interests of the named parties and the class members
who could sue separately because the interests of these groups are already addressed by the
existing law of res judicata and by relatively straightforward adaptations of it. Rather, we
should concentrate on the interests of those class members who could not or would not sue
separately because their interests reflect the special interests of class actions.
Second, while the Morguard principles may provide inspiration for the answers we
seek, the Morguard decision cannot supply the details of the standards and practices that we
need to develop because it was a case about the preclusive effect of judgments as they affect
the interests of named parties, and in particular, named defendants, and not about the
interests of class members, and in particular, unnamed plaintiffs who could not or would not
sue separately.
Third, despite the relative generosity that Canadian courts have shown to foreign
judgments generally, and foreign class actions judgments in particular, there have been some
striking refusals to recognize Canadian class action judgments and to grant preclusive effect
to them. These situations highlight the concerns of these courts that the interests of this third
group in ensuring adequate recovery or adequate incentives to more responsible conduct on
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the part of the defendants would not best be served by recognizing the decision of another
court and foregoing the opportunity to try the matter locally.
Fourth, while the refusal to recognize a judgment in a class action suggests that the
issuing court lacked jurisdiction to decide the case, the question is better understood as a
question of appropriate forum.
Fifth, an appropriate forum is one that engenders confidence that the interests in
adequate recovery or adequate protection from continued harm will be well served by the
trial of the matter there obviating the need for the matter to be heard elsewhere. Other factors
may be developed to choose between appropriate fora where it is desirable to do so.
Sixth, in the final analysis, this critical determination of appropriate forum should be
made at or before the certification stage and not after a judgment or settlement approval has
been rendered. Further, it is best done in by a multilateral body, one modeled on the US
MDL Panel with necessary procedural modifications to address the fact that it would operate
in Canada as a joint body comprised of the members of otherwise independent courts.

I—

WHO is affected by recognizing class action judgments from other jurisdictions?

As with all procedural reforms, to make workable rules for the recognition of
multijurisdiction class action judgments in Canada, we must be guided by a sense of whose
interests are affected and how these interests can best be served. Clearly the named parties
are affected by recognizing a class action judgment from another jurisdiction, but their
interests are similar to those of the parties in named party litigation. Their interests can be
safeguarded by the existing rules for the recognition of judgments.
A second group—class members—is also affected by recognizing class action
judgments from other jurisdictions. Their interests present special concerns. They have not
participated in the proceeding, but they will be precluded from bringing their claims in the
court recognizing the judgment.2 The interests of this second group are new, but they have
been considered on a number of occasions. Safeguarding the rights to notice and an
opportunity to opt out, and to adequate representation, all support the interests of those whose
2

This group is often divided into two—residents of the forum and non-residents. However, their interests are
not really different from one another. Courts do not ordinarily make rulings on whether claims are barred based
on the claimants’ residence. Class actions regimes do not work that way either unless the class description itself
refers to residence. On the contrary, recognizing a class action judgment precludes claims from being brought in
the local courts by all those who fall within the description of the class whether they are residents or nonresidents. And recognizing a class action judgment cannot restrain claimants, whether they are residents or nonresidents, from taking their claims to some other court. Accordingly, recognizing class action judgments is less
like recognizing foreign judgments than it is like the application of statutes of repose. Both combine principles
of fairness between the parties with the broader interests of the public, but where the law of foreign judgments
is traditionally focused more on a concern for fairness to the parties and whether they have had a chance to have
their day in court, the emphasis in recognizing class actions judgments is more on the broader public interest.
Recognizing a class action closes the doors of the court to anyone who might otherwise bring a claim falling
within the description of the class as certified. To be sure, the difference is only one of emphasis. But it points
out a distinction between named party litigation and class actions that has received little attention and will help
in developing suitable rules for multijurisdiction class actions as is discussed further below.
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claims could be brought separately from the class. Safeguards of this sort are well-established
in domestic class actions regimes and they can be adapted to multijurisdiction class actions.
But what of class members whose claims could not readily be brought in other
proceedings? From the perspective of the principles underlying named party litigation,
arguably the interests of this third group have not been affected. They may have claims, but
their choses in action are worthless and so their interests are not worth protecting. From the
perspective of class actions, however, the situation is very different. This third group has
much in common with the members of any class in a class action that has yet to be
commenced. If they could receive substantial relief but their claims are not independently
economically viable, their access to justice may have been restricted. If they could benefit
from incentives to suppliers of goods and services to act more responsibly, then they are part
of a community whose regulatory mechanisms may have been undermined. This is what a
class action could, and should, achieve for them.
Notice and an opportunity to opt out do little for the members of this third group if
they have no other way to seek compensation or redress. Even the adequacy of representation
in terms of giving them a sense of participating in the proceeding may seem less important
than whether the result is adequate in terms of the compensation or redress it provides. But
focusing on the interests of this third group may help us to develop a framework for the
recognition of multijurisdiction class action judgments in Canada—one based on the
principles underlying class actions.
Who is affected by recognizing class action judgments from other jurisdictions?—
Those affected include named parties, class members who could seek compensation or
redress independently and, most importantly, class members who could not.
But I am getting ahead of myself. It is better to begin at the beginning by picking up
the thread of the current discussion, one that looks for answers in the law of jurisdiction and
judgments and the constitutional principles enunciated by the Supreme Court of Canada in
Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye.3
II—

WHAT did Morguard really say about recognizing class action judgments?

Many have said that in the Morguard decision, the Supreme Court of Canada
discovered a “full faith and credit” clause in the Constitution that required Canadian courts to
recognize the judgments of other Canadian courts. And the judgment did say that the taking
of jurisdiction by a court in one province and its recognition in another must be viewed as
correlatives. As a result, the “Morguard principles” are principles of jurisdiction as well.
They reflect constitutional standards for assuming jurisdiction.4
Many have also suggested that the reasoning and the standards apply equally to the
preclusive effect of class action judgments on class members in other jurisdictions: where a
Canadian court has exercised appropriately restrained jurisdiction, and it has provided
adequate notice and an opportunity to opt out, there is a constitutional obligation to recognize
3
4
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the judgment. Despite this, Canadian courts are refusing to grant preclusive effect to class
action judgments and they are doing so for what seem to be compelling reasons.
To understand why, it is helpful to have another look at what the Supreme Court of
Canada actually said in Morguard. Starting with the obvious, there was no “full faith and
credit” clause to be discovered in the Canadian Constitution. Such a clause does exist in the
US Constitution5 and it creates a fixed obligation for American courts to recognize one
another’s judgments—whether or not it seems fair to do so under the circumstances. The
American courts soon realized that this could cause considerable mischief unless they
established a means of guaranteeing a measure of fairness to the persons affected.
Eventually, the due process clauses in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were pressed
into service as a foundation for basic jurisdictional standards. 6 These jurisdictional standards
prevent the hardship and confusion that could arise from the obligation to recognize
judgments from courts that ought not to have exercised jurisdiction.
The balance between the duty to recognize judgments and the duty to be fair to the
parties affected is echoed in Morguard in the “principles of order and fairness.”7 However,
there is a difference. In Morguard, the Supreme Court’s analysis proceeded from the
opposite direction. It did not take a fixed obligation to recognize judgments and make it
workable by adding constitutional safeguards to ensure fairness. Rather, the Court observed
that “concerns about differential quality of justice among the provinces can have no real
foundation” in Canada and therefore “a full faith and credit clause was unnecessary…”.
Generous standards for the recognition of judgments are implied in a federation and, in any
event, within the Canadian federation, there were unlikely to be sound reasons for a party to
object to the recognition of judgments from other parts of Canada on the basis of fairness.
This difference in the Supreme Court’s reasoning is important in understanding the
recent refusals by Canadian courts to recognize class action judgments from other Canadian
courts. It would be wrong to dismiss these refusals as recalcitrance or a failure to appreciate
the constitutional obligations enunciated in the Morguard decision. Canadian courts
recognize Canadian judgments because no unfairness results. That is why a full faith and
credit clause, though necessary to the operation of a federation, did not have to be written
into the Canadian Constitution. The recognition of class action judgments may also be
necessary to the Canadian federation, but where Canadian courts find that unfairness would
result, we must find ways to ensure that the process is fair so that a workable system can be
established.

5

Article IV.1 provides that “Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and
judicial proceedings of every other state.”
6

International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 at 316 (1945).
Which, in the common law provinces operates through the counterpart to the US “minimum contacts test”, the
“real and substantial connection test.” Although it was necessary for the common law provinces to add this
ground of jurisdiction to those of “consent” and “presence of the defendant” in their rules for recognizing
judgments, this was not necessary for Québec, where the international jurisdiction of Québec authorities is
provided for in Title III of Book X of the Code Civil: Spar Aerospace Ltd. v. American Mobile Satellite Corp.
[2002] 4 S.C.R. 205, 220 D.L.R. (4th) 54, 2002 SCC 78.
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The decisions of courts refusing to recognize Canadian class actions judgments are
important indications of the way forward. They highlight the ways in which class actions are
different from named party litigation. In adopting a regime for class actions, we might have
thought that we were just tweaking the rules of procedure to facilitate the aggregation of
claims and to enhance the ability of ordinary named party litigation to promote three wellestablished objectives of litigation (access to justice, judicial economy and behaviour
modification). But in the years since, the rivers of ink spilled and the forests felled in coming
to terms with the specialized practice of class actions bear testament to the fundamental
differences between class actions and ordinary litigation. Class actions are not so much a
procedural adjustment designed to facilitate the adjudication of claims that would otherwise
be difficult to pursue as they are a way of enabling courts to participate in a kind of
regulation that would otherwise be beyond their purview and, as a result, to play a new role
in society.
This is a discussion that is far larger than the scope of this paper, but it is relevant to
understanding the equities at stake in recognizing class action judgments. That class actions
do much more than we thought they would, and so require special rules for jurisdiction and
judgments, is news—not only to us, but, it would seem, to almost every country that has
adopted them. Taking the US as an example, in the history of American class actions, it was
forty years after the US Supreme Court made its famous pronouncement on due process,8 and
almost twenty years after the introduction of class actions,9 that the US Supreme Court
considered in the Shutts case how the due process clause would apply in the class actions
context.10 Twenty years later, it is still not obvious to outsiders reading the Court’s reasoning
in Shutts how the due process guarantees are the appropriate analytical framework for
serving the interests of the third group described above.
Accordingly, the question in Canada is not whether a constitutional requirement of
full faith and credit that was discovered by the Supreme Court in Morguard can be applied to
multijurisdiction class actions, but whether workable standards can be established to make it
reasonable to recognize class action judgments as precluding the claims of class members
from being commenced afresh. Morguard was a decision that enunciated important general
principles of broad application, but in its specifics, it was about the law of foreign judgments.
That law was designed for the interests of the first group (named parties) and, at best, it can
be adapted to serve the interests of the second group (those who could sue independently),
but it cannot serve the interests of the third group—ordinary class members with no other
means of compensation or redress. It is possible that the refusals in recent decisions of
Canadian courts to recognize class action judgments from other Canadian courts were
motivated by a sense that the interests of this third group needed to be served better. Pursuing
that line of inquiry seems far more promising than straining to find applicable rules in a
decision on the law of foreign judgments.
What did Morguard really say about recognizing class action judgments?—The
Morguard decision supplies the constitutional principles of order and fairness but we must
8

In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)
Rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1966.
10
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
9

6
develop jurisdictional standards and other procedures appropriate to the interests of all three
groups affected by the recognition of class actions in order to develop a system consistent
with the needs of the Canadian federation.
III— WHEN have courts recognized class action judgments (and when have they
refused)?
It would probably surprise persons from outside Canada to learn that Canadian courts
have seemed more willing to recognize foreign class action judgments than they have been to
recognize class action judgments from other parts of Canada. Still, examining the situations
in which the courts have recognized class action judgments and the situations in which they
have refused to do so can shed light on the jurisdictional considerations underlying a
workable system for the recognition of class action judgments.
In Currie v. McDonald's Canada, a class action against McDonald's Canada for fraud
in the allocation of prizes in promotional games offered to Canadian customers, McDonald’s
sought to dismiss the Canadian action on the basis that the matter had been resolved by an
Illinois judgment approving the settlement of a class action that purported to include the
Canadian class members. The Court of Appeal for Ontario held that a foreign class action
judgment could have preclusive effect provided there was a real and substantial connection
between the matter and the forum, the non resident class members were adequately
represented and they were accorded procedural fairness, including adequate notice and an
opportunity to opt out.11 This reasoning was consistent with the several previous decisions in
challenges to the jurisdiction of Ontario courts to certify multijurisdiction class actions.12
This reasoning addresses the interests of the first and second groups of persons described
earlier—the named parties and those whose claims could be brought elsewhere.
However, in other cases that considered the preclusive effect class actions judgments
from other provinces, the courts held that the judgments could not operate to preclude a local
class from bringing an independent claim seeking a different result. For example, in Lépine v.
Canada Post,13 Cybersurf sold its software for $9.95 through Canada Post and said it would
provide free Internet access in exchange for posting advertisements on the user’s computer
screen. When it began to charge its users $9.95 per month for access, class actions were
commenced in Ontario and Québec. The Ontario class action purported to include Québec
residents, and so residents of Québec received notices for both class actions. When the
defendant brought a motion in Québec to have the Ontario decision recognized as precluding
the Québec action, the Québec Court refused to do so because the duplicate notices received
by the Québec caused confusion.14

11

Currie v. McDonald’s Restaurants of Canada Ltd. [2005] O.J. No. 506 (C.A.) at para. 30.
Nantais v. Telectronics Proprietary (Canada) Ltd, supra, note 1; Carom v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd. (1999), 43
O.R. (3d) 441 (Gen. Div.); Wilson v. Servier (2000), 50 O.R. (3d) 219 (Ont. S.C.J.).
13
Lépine c. Société Canadienne des Postes [2005] Q.J. No. 9806; J.E. 2005-1631; EYB 2005-93155; (C.S.)
[2007] J.Q. no 8498; 2007 QCCA 1092; [2007] R.J.Q. 1920; J.E. 2007-1615; EYB 2007-122903 (C.A.); leave
to appeal granted [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 495.
14
Ibid. at para. 38.
12
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In HSBC v. Hocking,15 penalties were charged improperly to mortgagors who paid out
their mortgages early and, again, two class actions were brought—one in Ontario on behalf
of all Canadian residents and one in Québec on behalf of residents of Québec. This time, the
plaintiff in the Québec action sought to intervene in the Ontario action but was denied
permission to do so. The class action was certified in Ontario and a settlement was approved.
The defendant brought a motion in Québec to have the Ontario judgment recognized as
precluding the Québec action from proceeding. The Court refused because the claims before
it had no connection with Ontario, the representative plaintiff in the Québec action was not
able to participate in the negotiations between the parties to the Ontario action, the members
of the class would not receive any compensation, and they were denied an opportunity to
participate in the Ontario proceeding when their motion to intervene was rejected.16
When have courts recognized class action judgments (and when have they
refused)?—Procedural fairness requires adequate representation and notice and an
opportunity to opt out, but this is not always enough. To serve the interests of the third group,
they must be assured that their particular concerns will be addressed in the proceeding, and
that they will not be deprived of appropriate recovery or redress as a result of having the
matter decided in a distant forum that is insensitive to their particular interests.

IV— WHERE should multijurisdiction class actions be decided in Canada?
For the reasons considered at length in a number of decisions,17 there is simply no
credible challenge to be made to the basic jurisdiction of Canadian courts to certify
multijurisdiction class actions.18 This is not to say that there is no jurisdictional question to be
raised in determining whether to recognize a class action judgment or, to put it another way,
that there are no jurisdictional standards to be developed in creating a workable regime of
multijurisdiction class actions in Canada. Rather, it is to say that the question is not properly
one of jurisdiction simpliciter.
Several courts have recognized the merits in having common issues decided in a
single proceeding despite the fact that these might involve the claims of persons residing in
other provinces whose claims have arisen there. It stretches the concept of a “real and
substantial connection” to say that the real and substantial connection test supports
15

HSBC c. Hocking [2006] J.Q. no. 507; 2006 QCCS 330; [2006] R.J.Q. 804; J.E. 2006-517; EYB 2006100504 (S.C.).
16
Para 78: “La situation prévalant dans le présent dossier, aux yeux du Tribunal, n'est pas conforme aux
principes d'ordre et d'équité : la réclamation des membres québécois n'a aucun lien avec le forum ontarien, le
représentant québécois a tenté sans succès de participer aux négociations entreprises entre Hocking et HSBC,
les membres ne reçoivent aucune compensation suite au règlement et ils n'ont pas réussi à faire valoir leur point
de vue devant le Tribunal ontarien, leur intervention ayant été rejetée.”
17
See cases cited at note 12 above.
18

Although class actions legislation is promulgated pursuant to the constitutional grant to the provinces of
exclusive authority to make laws in relation to procedure in civil matters and this grant contains a limit on the
extraterritorial operation of that authority, section 92 provides for legislative authority, not judicial authority.
The judicial jurisdiction of the superior courts of Canada is founded on the traditional authority of the courts of
England and the provinces as reflected in section 129 of the Constitution Act, 1867 and it is informed by the
principles of order and fairness. See J. Walker, The Constitution of Canada and the Conflict of Laws (2001).
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jurisdiction over those claims. Nevertheless, Canadian courts have felt obliged to base their
conclusion on the real and substantial connection test. For example, in response to a
challenge to its jurisdiction to determine on an opt-in basis the claims of residents of other
provinces whose claims had arisen in their own province, the British Columbia Supreme
Court said the common issue could serve as a basis for jurisdiction because “it is that
common issue which establishes the real and substantial connection necessary for
jurisdiction.”19 Similarly, in a recent Ontario decision, it was observed that the courts in
Ontario accept “as a sufficiently real and substantial connection a commonality of interest
between non-resident class members and those who are resident in the forum and whose
causes of action have sufficiently real and substantial connections to it to ground jurisdiction
over their claims against the defendants.20
But this does not end the analysis. If there is no question of jurisdiction simpliciter,
there is certainly one of appropriate forum. If there was only one court in Canada authorized
to determine class actions, we would find ways to ensure to the extent possible that the
benefits of the class actions decided there were enjoyed in all the communities throughout the
country where the cause of action arose. But now we have class actions in most Canadian
jurisdictions and we must find ways to address the concerns arising from overlapping and
competing class actions without losing the benefits to those communities of local
representation, local adjudication, and local awards. In this way it is not so much that the
rules of jurisdiction and judgments need to be adapted to the multijurisdiction context as the
procedures developed for contested carriage motions and settlement approval hearings need
to be adapted to take into account the special concerns of multijurisdiction class actions.
Englund v. Pfizer Canada Inc. illustrates the challenges we face. The Saskatchewan
Court of Queen’s Bench refused to stay a proposed class proceeding on behalf of
Saskatchewan residents who were presumptively included in the multijurisdiction class
pending in Ontario because that would “recognize legislation enabled by other jurisdictions
that intentionally encroaches on the right of its residents to seek judicial recourse for losses
they suffered as a consequence of a tort or breach of the law committed within the
Province.”21 On appeal, the decision was reversed because the plaintiffs, who, it seems, were
the same in both proceedings, had shown no reason why the matter could not be heard in a
single proceeding in either forum and the Court held that they should be put to their election.
The Court of Appeal granted a stay that could be lifted if the Ontario action was
discontinued. 22 The plaintiffs’ were then permitted by the Ontario court to discontinue the
Ontario opt-out national class in favour of the Saskatchewan opt-in national class, which
counsel preferred because Saskatchewan is a “no costs” jurisdiction. 23
19

Harrington v Dow Corning (1997) 29 BCLR (3d) 88 (SC), (2000) 193 DLR (4th) 67 (CA), leave to appeal to
SCC dismissed SCC Bulletin 2001, 270.

20

McCutcheon v. The Cash Store Inc., [2006] O.J. No. 1860 (S.C.J.) at para. 49. In Risorto v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. [2007] O.J. No. 676 the court held that including class members subject to
different statutory regimes was not a bar to certification.
21
Englund v. Pfizer Canada Inc., [2006] S.J. No. 9 (Q.B.) at para. 44.
22
Englund v. Pfizer Canada Inc., [2007] S.J. No. 273; 2007 SKCA 62; 284 D.L.R. (4th) 94; [2007] 9 W.W.R.
434; 299 Sask.R. 298; 43 C.P.C. (6th) 296 (C.A.).
23

Sollen v. Pfizer Canada Inc. [2008] O.J. No. 866 (Ont. S.C.J.). Query whether the interests of plaintiffs’
counsel in trial in a “no-costs” jurisdiction coupled with defendants’ interests in trial in a jurisdiction that
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Where should multijurisdiction class actions be decided in Canada?—This is the key
question that we face, but it is best answered in two parts, which will comprise the last two
parts of this paper. First, we must develop a more nuanced approach to the choices between
appropriate fora by considering the interests of the third group and why from their
perspective it might be reasonable to recognize class actions judgments from other courts.
Second, we must develop adjudicative mechanisms to enable the multilateral determination
of the appropriate forum for class actions in Canada that can operate in a legal system
comprised of independently administered courts.
V—

WHY should Canadian courts recognize class action judgments?

All private law litigation serves the combined purposes of compensating persons for
losses suffered and creating incentives to others to act responsibly so as to avoid causing
such loss. One extraordinary feature of class actions that has only become clear with
experience is that as the aggregation of claims increases the ability of private law litigation to
serve these purposes, it also tends to drive a wedge between them.
Some class actions serve primarily the needs of persons who have suffered
measurable losses that would go uncompensated but for their ability to join together to seek
relief. Other class actions, involving nominal losses, serve primarily the needs of the broader
public to be protected from misconduct by establishing effective sanctions to encourage more
responsible conduct. It would be wrong to suggest that there is an absolute distinction
between these two kinds of class actions, but much confusion has resulted from trying to
develop principles and procedures for both without regard to the differences between them.
In class actions commenced primarily to promote access to justice for those who have
suffered measurable losses, the pressing considerations in resolving the matter relate to the
adequacy of the recovery. The extent of recovery will almost always amount to a
compromise between what they “should” receive and what is reasonably available. Claimants
often receive far less than what they might receive in theory if they claimed individually, but
this is an abstract consideration because, as a practical matter, their claims could not be
brought independently and they have been aggregated to make them economically viable.
The question in the multijurisdiction context is whether the relief granted to these
persons has been diminished by reason of the fact that it was granted by a court other than the
court being asked to recognize the judgment. This could be as a result of differences in the
legal principles that the recognizing court would itself apply, or as a result of some other
jurisdiction-specific feature of the litigation. Of course, considerable care would need to be
taken in conducting a review of this sort to ensure that this review was not taken as an
opportunity to re-open the litigation, or to argue why different counsel might have provided
better representation—other than for forum-specific reasons. And to the extent that review of
this sort was available in principle, it would be likely that these issues would be anticipated
and addressed directly in a judgment or settlement approval, perhaps one that benefited from
interventions from those who might otherwise challenge the result.

requires non-resident class members to opt in, serves the best interests of the third group considered throughout
this paper.
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Indeed, to the extent that review of the relief granted might always have an inherent
tendency to undermine the finality of class action judgments it would be preferable to
develop a means for addressing this concern as a matter of course, at the certification stage,
as will be discussed in the next section. Where such concerns are justified, certainty would be
enhanced by ensuring that the class of persons who might be prejudiced by being prevented
access to the court to which they would otherwise resort are given appropriate relief as a subclass or are presumptively excluded from the original class action.
Different considerations arise in class actions that involve nominal losses and that are
commenced primarily to serve the needs of the broader public by establishing effective
sanctions to encourage more responsible conduct. In these actions, the question is whether
recognizing the judgment will provide adequate incentives to the defendant, and to others
who might cause similar harm, to take steps to avoid causing such harm in the future not only
in the jurisdiction where the judgment was issued but also in the jurisdiction in which
recognition is sought.
In conducting this analysis there may be a tendency to assume that local measures are
the best protection for the local public. But any regulatory measures, including class actions,
involve public expense and so the benefits of an additional local action should be weighed
against the likelihood that the judgment would provide adequate incentives to the defendant
and to others similarly situated to improve their conduct in ways that would benefit not only
the public in the forum where the judgment was issued but also in the forum where the
judgment is recognized. Still, where an award provides nominal or no compensation for class
members and, instead, requires some contribution to the welfare of the broader community,
courts will be concerned to ensure that the communities that benefit include those in the fora
in which other class actions might be commenced.
These are reasons for recognizing class action judgments from other courts in
Canada, but they can also provide guidance in the processes of defining the class, measuring
the adequacy of representation and the litigation plan, resolving contested carriage motions,
and assessing the adequacy of the proposed relief in a settlement hearing.
In some cases, these considerations would be enough to determine where a
multijurisdiction class action would best be decided, but in others, these requirements could
be met in more than one jurisdiction. In those cases, provided that the matter could be
resolved effectively in a single proceeding without prejudicing the interests of members of
the class, these considerations would represent only a starting point in determining which
forum among the various appropriate fora should assume carriage of the matter.
In developing a means of choosing between otherwise appropriate fora, guidance may
be found in the factors considered by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation in the
United States Federal Court (the “MDL Panel”) in the selection of a particular district for
transfer of multi-district actions for consolidated pretrial proceedings. These factors include:
• that the district is easily accessible, or a convenient, central location with respect to
all the actions, or the parties, documents, or witnesses.
• the district's neutral status.
• the pendency in that district of a number of the actions.
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

the pendency of related civil actions or agency proceedings.
the district court's familiarity with the issues involved in the litigation.
the favorable status of the caseload or civil dockets in the district as where the district
did not have any other multidistrict litigation on its docket.
that the district is a metropolitan district, well equipped with the resources that the
complex docket was likely to require.
that significant discovery is likely to take place in the district.
that the district is site of the furthest advanced action.
all of the parties' agreement to the transfer.
the transferee judge's prior, successful experience with multidistrict litigation.24

Clearly not all of these factors would be relevant to the determination of the appropriate
forum in the Canadian context, but they could provide a useful starting point for the
development of factors suitable for Canada.
Why should Canadian courts recognize class action judgments?—They should do so
because, where appropriate, the persons who might otherwise seek recovery from them is not
prejudiced by having had their rights being determined in the other forum, or because the
incentives to defendants and others similarly situated to modify their behaviour will result in
sufficient benefits to the community of the recognizing court to render a local class action
unwarranted. Beyond this, the Canadian courts may be guided in developing rules for
determining the appropriate forum or fora the litigation of a class action or related class
actions by referring to the factors considered by the US MDL Panel.
VI— HOW should the appropriate forum be determined?
A discussion of the standards to be applied in determining the appropriate forum for
multijurisdiction class actions is only of practical benefit if there is an adjudicative
mechanism or body capable of making such determinations. The potential for this sort of
determination made in the existing adjudicative structure of independently administered
courts to suffer from incomplete information or conflicts between the interests of counsel and
the class is becoming evident.25 However, to establish a mechanism or body to make a single
determination within the structure of the Canadian judicial system with its independently
administered courts requires considerable collective interest and some ingenuity.
In its Report on National Class Actions, the Uniform Law Conference of Canada’s
Committee canvassed the options.26 The Committee acknowledged the merits of the
approach taken by the United States Federal Court in establishing the MDL Panel. However,
at the time it seemed unlikely that the Constitution Act, 1867 could be interpreted to permit
such authority to be vested in the Federal Court of Canada, and the political will needed to
create a new s. 101 court seemed unlikely to emerge. The Committee reflected on the
24
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The Report is available on the ULCC website at www.ulcc.ca.
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possibility that such a body could operate as a committee of the Canadian Judicial Council,
which was created “… to promote efficiency and uniformity, and to improve the quality of
judicial service, in superior courts,” but this, too, seemed ambitious.
Ultimately, the Committee proposed a series of principles that could be applied by
Canadian courts in the ordinary course of determining motions for certification. Though this
option was less likely to be as effective as an authoritative multilateral body, there seemed no
way to endow a multilateral body with the necessary authority. How could such a body
decide on behalf of a section 96 court whether it should or should not exercise jurisdiction
over a matter before it? And so it was hoped that a central registry granting ready access to
the information on class actions commenced across the country, and a sense of the urgency of
coordinating multijurisdiction class actions, would encourage the provincial superior courts
operating independently to generate an informal system of cooperation.
Since the time the Report was adopted by the Uniform Law Conference, the need to
develop an effective means of coordinating multijurisdiction class actions has become even
more pressing, as is evident from the rulings discussed above. Further reflection suggests that
it may be possible to develop a means of overcoming the hurdles of an independently
administered court system to create a Canadian version of the MDL Panel, based on a model
proposed by Chief Justice Winkler, which in Canada could be called a Multijurisdiction
Class Proceedings Panel (“MCPP”).
The procedural reforms necessary to establishing such a panel would require two
components: a revised function for the national registry, and a deliberative body comprised
of representatives of all the courts that might be appropriate fora for multijurisdiction class
actions in Canada. In such a system a judge of the court in which the matter was first
commenced would participate in a hearing panel, and would therefore decide whether to stay
permanently the matter commenced in his or her court or to ask his or her Chief Justice to
assign it to a member of that court, and the Attorneys-General of the other Canadian courts
would act as nominal plaintiffs in actions that would be commenced pro forma and stayed
pending the determination of the MCPP. Here is how it could work:
With respect to the registry, each province with class proceedings legislation could
pass legislation requiring parties who commence multijurisdiction class actions to forward
the notice of proceeding to a centralized registry upon issuing it in the province. The registry,
which could be developed from the existing National Class Actions Database, would be
authorized by the legislation to receive the notices of proceedings and to forward them to the
Attorneys General of each province to be re-issued in their provinces with the Attorneys
General serving as the nominal applicants in matters styled “In Re Multijurisdiction Class
Proceeding Concerning… ”). The provincial legislation would further provide that a stay
would automatically be issued in those proceedings and in any related proceedings
subsequently issued in the province pending a determination by the Panel.
With respect to the Panel, the Chief Justice of each jurisdiction could designate a
judge to serve as a member. Hearing panels could be struck periodically to hear applications,
consisting of two judges and an alternate. Panels assigned to specific cases would be
composed of the two judges and a judge of the jurisdiction in which the matter was first
issued. Where the judge from the jurisdiction in which the matter was first issued was already
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a member of the panel, the alternate would be called upon to join the panel. With the panels
constituted in this way, the decision to issue a stay or directions to proceed could be adopted
by the judge of the court in which the matter was first issued and, accordingly, would be
rendered on the basis of that judge’s own authority as a member of court in which the matter
was commenced.27 Once the panel had made its determination, the pro-forma proceedings
commenced by the Attorneys General in the other jurisdictions could be dismissed on
consent attaching the ruling of the MCP Panel.
How should the appropriate forum be determined?—The appropriate forum for
multijurisdiction class actions in Canada should be determined a Canadian equivalent to the
US MDL Panel.
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Measures would have to be developed to address situations in which the same or a related proceeding was
issued on the same day in more than one jurisdiction. Adjustments in the Panel could be made to enable judges
from other provinces to sit on the Panel. In cases in which counsel commence proceedings simultaneously in
multiple jurisdictions it may be desirable to require them to elect one jurisdiction as the relevant jurisdiction for
the purposes of MCP determinations.

